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Whether an income tax ought to be progressive is one of the many
issues raised by the difficult problem of defining a fair tax. The con-
cept of a fair tax is so complex because taxation itself involves many
complicated issues. There is no universal Fair Tax; rather, as Harold
Groves has said: "Taxation is an art and a technique as well as a sci-
ence, and it always needs to be judged against the conditions of time
and place."' Accordingly, a determination of a fair tax must consider
economic, philosophical, political, and practical elements. 2 Each of
these elements, of course, is multi-faceted.
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Despite the difficulty of defining a fair tax, a progressive rate struc-
ture has been a constant feature of the income tax since 1913, when
the first income tax was enacted under the Sixteenth Amendment.!
At that time, most of the general public, politicians and economists
accepted the idea of progressivity (though they disagreed as to the
appropriate rates) because it conformed to their conception of
"ability to pay," which was the basis of the income tax.4 Support for
progressivity continued, though sometimes uneasily, for decades.5 In
the mid-1970s, however, this consensus began to disintegrate. Oppo-
sition to progressivity arose in the 1970s, grew in the 1980s, culmi-
nated in the greatly compressed rate structure found in the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, and re-emerged-stronger than ever-in the
1990s. 6
In 1987, following the passage of the 1986 Act, I published an arti-
cle in the Michigan Law Review entitled The Rhetoric of the Anti-
Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction. The article
considered traditional arguments for and against progressivity and
examined the rhetoric accompanying opposition to progressivity, as
well as the individualistic philosophy underpinning it.8 It suggested
that alternative philosophies or visions of society could provide un-
3. The first federal income tax in the United States was enacted in August 1861. See Act
of August 5, 1861, ch. 45 § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309. InJuly 1862 Congress repealed the Act before
it was effective, and replaced it with another. The 1862 Act was slightly graduated, with a 35%
tax rate on incomes between $601 and $10,000 and a 55% tax rate on incomes above $10,000.
SeeAct ofJuly 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Star. 432, 473 (1862).
4. For a discussion of the passage of the 1913 act, see ROY BLAKEY & GLADYS BLAKEY, THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 71-103 (1940), or SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION 324-33 (1942).
Most advocates favored progressivity for "ability to pay" reasons, but some favored it on redis-
tributive grounds. See JOHN BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 42-49
(1985). The progressive structure was soon challenged in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co., but the Court upheld it with little discussion. See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R Co., 240
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that progressive tax violated due process
clause of Constitution).
5. See generally SHELDON D. POLLACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY: REVENUE AND
POLITICS 42-49 (1995) (providing overview of tax reform proposals from ratification of Six-
teenth Amendment to present and detailing continued debate over 'justice and equity" of pro-
gressive tax yet continued passage of some); WalterJ. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case
for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); CHARLES GALVIN & BORIS BUTTKER, THE
INCOME TAX, How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? (1969).
6. See POLLACK, supra note 5, at 78-115 (describing emotional debates over tax equity in
context of the 1975 tax bill and President Carter's tax proposal of 1977, as well as proposed tax
reforms in the 1980s and growing congressional concern about progressive taxation).
7. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typi-
cal Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987).
8. See id. at 474 (identifying equity as many proponents' ultimate goal); id. at 471-72
(describing traditional critique of progressivity for increasing complexity of tax laws, promot-
ing economic inefficiency and political irresponsibility); id. at 486 (criticizing opponents'
rhetoric for confusing tax debate by obscuring underlying premises of economic arguments);
id. at 469 (characterizing philosophical opposition as being based on belief in primacy of indi-
vidual and individual rights).
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derlying support for progressivity and described a feminist "ethos of
care" as an example of such support.'
Recently, William Turnier, Pamela Johnston Conover and David
Lowery undertook an empirical study (hereinafter the "Turnier
study") to test whether the feminine voice, and in particular an ethos
of care, actually supports progressive taxation. In an article pub-
lished in The American University Law Review entitled Redistributivejus-
tice and Cultural Feminism,'0 they concluded that support for progres-
sive taxation among women exceeds that among men by only "a very
narrow margin."'" As a result of this alleged contradiction between
their empirical findings and the theoretical claims, they argued that
research should focus on empirical studies rather than theory.
2
Are these two articles contradictory, and if so, which article is cor-
rect? Do women support progressive taxation? How do we prove (or
disprove) it? Has the Turnier study proved that women do not sup-
port progressivity significantly more than men? Have they, therefore,
discredited the feminist ethos of care and the role of theory?
This brief rejoinder explains why the Turnier study fails to dis-
prove feminist theoretical claims concerning progressivity. Even if
the study did disprove these claims, however, the value of theory still
remains.
The Turnier study attempts to measure empirically the correlation
between gender and feminism (particularly, cultural feminism) 3 and
redistributive justice, as illustrated by attitudes about social spending
and tax fairness. I will focus on tax fairness. Although Turnier,
Conover and Lowery expected to find that women were more sup-
portive of progressive taxation than men, they were surprised to find
only a "very weak" positive correlation between feminist identifica-
tion and tax fairness. 4 They concluded, therefore, that their study
"did not bear out the dramatic claims made by proponents of cul-
tural feminist jurisprudence regarding the potential impact" of gen-
9. See id. at 507-10 (describing an "ethos of care" as a perception of one's interconnect-
edness with, and responsibility to, others). Other community-oriented visions of society in-
clude various religious and political-based communities such as the Oneida community and
theories such as republicanism. See id. at 505-06.
10. William J. Turnier et al., RedistributiveJustice and Cultural Feminism, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1275 (1996).
11. Id. at 1312.
12. See id. at 1315-17.
13. See id. at 1279-82. The authors base their description of cultural feminism on Carol
Gilligan's theory that women speak in a different voice than men. According to Gilligan, men
define themselves as separate from others and speak from an "ethos of rights," whereas women
define themselves through connectedness to others and speak from an "ethos of care." They
do not, however, define the ethos of care in any detail.
14. See id. at 1312.
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der and the ethos of care for changing substantive law. 5 Conse-
quently, they urged scholars to shift their attention from feminist
theory to empirical studies because "[t] o allow theorists, regardless of
their good intentions, to articulate their version of the message of
previously excluded voices is merely to substitute a new form of
dominance for an old one. It is far more preferable to allow all ex-
cluded components to speak for themselves.'
16
This dismissal of theory and exaltation of empirical studies is un-
warranted. To maintain that a multiple choice poll allows "excluded
components" to speak for themselves is extremely optimistic, at best,
given the many known difficulties of such polls. Moreover, the Turn-
ier study does not disprove feminists' claims because the study is
flawed. Finally, even if the study empirically had disproved the
claims, it would not invalidate the worth of feminist jurisprudence.
There are two major flaws in the study design, the use of a two fac-
tor tax fairness index as a measure of tax fairness and the method of
identifying feminists. Tax fairness and feminist identification are dif-
ficult issues to address in a survey; perhaps any methodology would
be flawed. Nevertheless, the resultant flaws must be scrutinized to
determine whether the study disproves its hypothesis.
The issue of tax fairness is indisputably difficult to address, espe-
cially in a survey. Polls have many problems, such as sampling issues,
and extreme language sensitivity. How a question is phrased (e.g., in
the negative or the positive; in the abstract or the specific), as well as
the order in which questions appear, 17 can greatly affect the response.
Tax attitudes are particularly sensitive to language because most
people have little knowledge of tax matters 8 For example, a recent
poll showed that many people believed that the Clinton administra-
tion enacted a value-added tax. 9 Another problem is that much of
what people believe is conveyed by the media. For example, the me-
dia stresses marginal rates rather than effective rates. Thus, people
15. See id. at 1305-06.
16. Id. at 1317-18.
17. See, e.g., Randolph E. Schmid, Census Feeling Out Multi-Racial Option, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
May 16, 1997, at A15 (reporting that more people answer a question concerning whether a per-
son is of Hispanic origin if it is asked before a question on race).
18. See Clay Chandler, Will the Republicans Trip Over Tax Reform?, WASH. POST, Aug. 13,
1995, at H1 (revealing polling data showing that nearly seven in ten respondents had not
"heard or read anything" about a flat tax and suggesting that public response to flat tax de-
pended largely on the manner in which the issue was phrased in recent surveys). Another
problem in surveys on taxation is the fact that almost everyone hates to pay taxes, which raises a
host of psychological issues. SeeJOSHUA D. ROSENBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TAXES: WHY THEY
DRIVE US CRAzY, AND How WE CAN MAKE THEM SANE 155 (1996).
19. See Chuck Davenport, Tax System Under Attack, Samuels Tells Law School Professoys, 66TAX
NOTES 321 (1995).
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are more aware of the highest tax rate that they pay only on their last
dollars of income than they are of the average or effective tax rate
paid on all their income." The complex relation between a person's
conception of distributive justice and actual distributions creates an-
other difficulty. There is a large, unsettled debate in sociological lit-
erature about whether our normative beliefs affect our perceptions
of reality and how accurate our perceptions of reality are.1 In short,
the complexity of the tax fairness issue combined with the natural
limitations of surveys makes it difficult for a multiple choice poll to
capture completely respondents' true attitudes.
Given all the difficulties of polling-especially with regard to issues
of taxation-any questions asked would be open to some criticism.
The two factor tax fairness index used by the Turnier study is particu-
larly suspect. The index consists of two issues "that have figured
prominently during the past few decades in national debates regard-
ing tax issues, the progressive tax system and the preferential treat-
ment of capital gains."' The authors chose this index because my
progressivity article purportedly implied that there was only "a single
dimension underlying tax fairness issues."' I do not think that I
made any such implied assertion.24 Even if I had implied a single
concept that translated into a tax fairness index that includes capital
20. See Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and Compliance, 16
LAW & POL'y 27, 40-42 (1994) (showing that the typical citizen will pick as a fair tax rate a figure
close to statutory marginal rates but will choose a dollar amount closer to the current effective
or average rate).
21. See, e.g., ALAN LEWIS, THEPSYCHOLOGYOFTAxATON (1982); Davenport, supra note 19,
at 321 (citing an opinion poll that showed many people erroneously believed that the Clinton
administration enacted a value-added tax); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1873 (1994).
22. Turnier et al., supra note 10, at 1301.
23. Id. at 1302. In note 155 the authors say: "We analyzed the two factor tax fairness index
given Kornhauser's implied assertion that there is a single dimension underlying tax fairness
issues. See Kornhauser, supra note 7, at 468-69 (suggesting that two principle arguments under-
lying objection to progressive tax as being unfair-'market efficiency' and philosophy of
'individualism'-are so closely related as to actually be one concept)." What I actually said on
those quoted pages is: "Underlying and shaping the current objections [to progressivity] are
the neoclassical economic arguments of market efficiency, and the philosophic premises of
individualism based on concomitant beliefs in the primacy of individual property rights and a
government with limited functions." See id. (internal citations omitted).
24. Neither my quoted words nor the article necessarily leads to the inference drawn by
the Turnier study. Certainly my article stated that the concepts of market efficiency and indi-
vidualism are connected-one supports the other. That statement, however, is a far cry from
saying that there is one single dimension underlying tax fairness. Although the article showed
that the market efficiency arguments rested on philosophic premises, and not on neutral scien-
tific findings, the article did not-and never attempted to-deny that economic efficiency had
any valuable role in taxation. I was not trying to destroy the argument, only its privileged posi-
tion based on objectivity. A feminist ethos of care does not have to ignore economic efficiency
arguments, it just would not privilege them. See id. at 488 (explaining that economic models
should not be an instrument for policy formation because of the assumptions present in
-'scientific methodology'").
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gains,25 however, such an index would not be an accurate polling de-
vice for determining the public's ideas regarding tax fairness. Public
finance scholars and other financially knowledgeable individuals may
understand the correlation between redistributive justice and capital
gains. It is unlikely, however, that the average person would recog-
nize it because he is generally fiscally unsophisticated, unaware of tax
issues, or views them through a distorted cognitive lens. Conse-
quently, most feminists, like most other people, would be unlikely to
recognize any connection between an ethos of care and capital gains
preferences, or even between progressivity and capital gains. This is
especially true because there is nothing obvious in the issues (or the
wording of the questions) used in the Turnier study to connect capi-
tal gains to progressivity, let alone to an ethos of care. It is not sur-
prising, then, that the authors found only a "weak correlation" be-
tween capital gains and progressivity. 26 It is the academic connection
that led to the inclusion of the capital gains question in the index.
Just as troublesome as the index is the methodology used to iden-
tify those respondents who are feminists. The authors attached a
feminist label to all subjects who identified themselves as suchY. Self-
identification is an easily quantifiable technique for a poll to use, but
it is always subject to great inaccuracies. People frequently tell inter-
viewers what they think the interviewers want o hear. Sometimes
people honestly say they believe one thing, but in fact do another.'
Self-identification as a feminist is particularly open to distortion be-
cause of negative connotations attached to the label,3° which are
25. Even if I did imply a single concept, that does not necessarily translate into a tax fair-
ness index that includes capital gain. Arguably, there could be an economic argument strong
enough to support a capital gains deduction while still satisfying progressivity by adjusting the
rest of the rates.
26. SeeTurnier et al., supra note 10, at 1312.
27. See id. at 1302-03 n.157. Initially, the authors included other questions in addition to
self-identification to determine whether the respondent was a feminist. The questions con-
cerned whether the respondent was proud of women's accomplishments. They eliminated
these questions from their "feminist" label because many subjects did not answer them, thus
reducing the sample size. See id. This illustrates the problem of self-identification, which the
authors acknowledged. Nevertheless, they used this as their sole method to identify feminists.
28. See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 47 (describing how respondents' replies in surveys and
polls are often manipulated). "[R]espondents look for guidance to the interviewers and ques-
tions as to what their answers ought to be. Very few of us have the tenacity to admit our igno-
rance in public, especially about things we feel we ought to know about." Id. at 48-49.
29. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income Sharing, and the
Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 84 (1993) (revealing that many couples respond
inconsistently to questions about whether they share money).
30. See Cheryl B. Preston, This Old House: A Blueprint for Constructive Feminism, 83 GEO. LJ.
2271, 2284-89 (1995) (discussing the meaning of the word 'feminism' as expressed by college
students in personal journal entries). One student wrote "'Feminism': Angry, obnoxious, dis-
respectful, insulting, shrill, unladylike, ungraceful, disgraceful, anti-, anti-, (always) anti-, fa-
natic, deluded, etc. These are some of the words that come to mind when I think of the word
156
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largely a product of media treatment.3' Probably all of us have heard
women say, "I'm not a feminist, but .... ,,32 What follows the 'but'
may be a variety of statements regarding such things as equal rights,
equal pay and equal respect. In other words, many women reject the
label, but hold feminist beliefs.3  Given this phenomenon, self-
identification of feminists would omit many people who hold femi-
nist beliefs. Those who did identify themselves as feminists, however,
might be assumed to be strongly feminist. This is not necessarily
true. Self-identification does not necessarily correlate with the
strength of belief held. A host of complex sociological, psychologi-
cal, and even political reasons is needed to explain why some people
identify themselves as feminists and others do not.
Even if it were true that only those holding strong feminist beliefs
identified themselves as feminists, this would not necessarily translate
into a strong positive response to the tax fairness index, for all the
procedural reasons-including the difficulties of polling in general,
and this poll in particular-previously discussed.34 Feminists might
respond very differently to questions that have only slight differences
in phrasing."s For example, people are more likely to support a tax if
they know what benefits the tax revenues will provide. 6 It is conceiv-
able that a question that tied the progressivity to this social spending
would produce a higher correlation between progressivity and femi-
nism than the Turnier study demonstrated with its questions.
Given the difficulties of the Turnier study, as well as empirical stud-
ies in general, the authors' study does not disprove a correlation be-
tween an ethos of care and progressivity. Even if such negative proof
were to exist in an ideal, problem-free poll, however, it would not
necessarily disprove the correlation for all situations or discount the
'feminism.'" Id. at 2285. Another student wrote, "When I told people I am in Feminist Legal
Thought they had quite strong negative reactions.... I didn't realize that just use of the word
'feminist' could conjure up so many negative reactions." Id. at 2286 n.51.
31. SeeSUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH 75-168 (1991).
32. See Claudia Wallis, Onward, Women!, TIME, Dec. 4, 1989, at 80 (discussing the "No,
but..." generation of women who reject the feminist label). Thomas Petzinger, Jr. quotes a
woman complaining about being patronized in the workplace as saying, "I am not a women's
libber and never will be.... I just wanted to be taken seriously." Thomas Petzinger, Jr., The
Front Line, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1997, at B1. Isn't being 'taken seriously' the essence of the
feminism she disdains?
33. See Preston, supra note 30, at 2287 n.55 (describing the consequences of feminism's
negative connotation on surveys).
34. See Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 643 (discussing the drawbacks of open-ended or mul-
tiple-choice questions); see also supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
35. See Preston, supra note 30, at 2287 n.55 (explaining disparate effect obtained by surveys
that omitted the word "feminist").
36. See LEis, supra note 21, at 40 (stating that support for tax system increases when ques-
dons mention its benefits).
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value of feminist theory. To abandon theory for empirical studies,
even to privilege studies,37 is to allow a useful but far from perfect
tool to impose its own tyranny-the very thing the authors accuse
theory of doing.s'
From a practical standpoint, both people and the topic of progres-
sivity and taxation are too complex for a multiple choice poll to cap-
ture in reality. Certainly, polls can produce quantifiable results that
look unambiguous, but such an appearance merely hides the messier
truth. Although it is possible for a person to hold an ethos of care
yet not support progressivity,3 9 polls easily can find too many such
persons, too many false negatives, as it were, for several reasons.
First, a finding that women do not favor progressivity does not
necessarily contradict a connection between progressivity and an
ethos of care because that ethos does not support such a connection
in all situations. Turnier never discusses the finer details of an ethos
of care, speaking only generally about webs of relationships and
communities.4 0  These relationships and communities, however, are
37. See Turnier et al., supra note 10, at 1316-17 (concluding that feminist theory has little
effect on the development of attitudes towards redistributive justice and that empirical studies,
rather than theory, are more valid indicators of the true opinions and interests of constituents).
38. See id. at 1317-18 (maintaining that it is preferable to allow all excluded voices to ex-
press their own views and opinions rather than listening to theorists articulate the views of the
excluded group).
39. See Kornhauser, supra note 7, at 470 (concluding that an ethos of care provides a philo-
sophic rationale for a progressive tax but does not compel progressivity). The general tenor of
my progressivity article spoke in terms of support. See id. One sentence, however, did state
that, "[o]ther views of humanity, such as the feminist vision, see people as interrelated and
therefore support and even mandate some progressivity." Id. at 518. Despite this sentence,
most scholars correctly interpreted the article in light of its general tenor and cite it for the
view that an ethos of care supports progressivity. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstream-
ingFeminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC. LJ. 1493, 1531 (1992) (observing that feminist theory may of-
fer justification for a progressive tax system); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. LJ.
1571, 1628 n.246 (1996) (maintaining that the feminist perspective supports progressive taxa-
tion); G. Marc Worthy, Note, An Examination of Tax Law and Supply Side Economics: Creed of Greed
or Opportunity for All 72 N.D. L. REV. 691, 691 (1996) (noting that the debate over taxation in-
cludes radically different perspectives supporting progressive taxation). The Turnier study
correctly notes my use of the word "mandate," but states alternatively that I claim the ethos of
care supports progressivity or mandates it. SeeTurnier et al., supra note 10, at 1292.
My use of the word "mandate" was injudicious. I am only claiming that an ethos of care pro-
vides an underlying philosophic justification for progressivity. A person could believe in an
ethos of care and satisfy it through means other than a progressive tax system, such as voluntary
contributions of time, money or goods to the less fortunate. Consequently, an ethos of care
does not mandate progressivity, but would be logically more likely to support a progressive tax
than other, more individualistic, philosophies. See Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal
Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 77 n.148 (1996) (finding theory that feminist values support
progressivity persuasive).
40. See Turnier et al., supra note 10, at 1279-85 (discussing the cultural feminist perspec-
tive, which asserts that decisions and choices based on an ethos of care emphasize care and en-
hances the connectedness of other individuals within a community). This view lies in contrast
to the ethos of rights approach, which focuses on the individual. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENTVOICE: PSYCHOLOGICALTHEORYANDWOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 7-8 (1982).
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not undifferentiated. An ethos of care does not mandate that a per-
son must care for everyone equally; rather, there are levels of care
based on the relationship between the caregiver and the cared-for;
the closer the relationship, the greater the caregiver's duty of care.
Although there is a duty of care to a stranger, it is a minimal duty that
does not require great sacrifice. A progressive income tax may be a
relatively non-burdensome way to fulfill our minimal obligations to
strangers because it does not require a person to sacrifice time or ef-
fort that a closer relationship or web would require. As a conse-
quence, a person may believe in an ethos of care and maintain that a
progressive tax is a way to perform her minimal duty of care to
strangers. If she already feels so overburdened that she cannot fulfill
her greater obligations to her family, however, then even under an
ethos of care she would not have any obligation to help strangers.4'
Thus, her negative answers to polling questions about progressive
taxation might reflect her current unpleasant reality, rather than any
theoretical beliefs in an ethos of care or progressivity.
Second, people can and do hold contradictory beliefs at the same
time. Views and actions on particular issues do not always coincide
with peoples' general overall philosophy. Sometimes this occurs
because they do not realize that a particular belief or action impli-
cates-let alone conflicts with-a different belief. This is particularly
true with regard to a sophisticated, yet emotionally-charged topic like
taxation. Given more information, people may change their views so
that they are more consistent. On certain issues, however, two con-
tradictory beliefs held with equal intensity may coexist, although
perhaps uneasily. Again, taxation is a subject where this easily can
happen because money and taxation involve many complex beliefs
about society, justice and the role of government. Americans are in-
deed ambivalent about wealth and taxation.l The interaction of this
ambivalence with cultural feminist beliefs surely is more complex
than a simple multiple choice survey can reveal.
41. See NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININEAPPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION
46 (1984) (explaining that "concentric circles of caring," based on proximity of relationships,
define limits and degrees of care expected of the individual towards others in the community);
Kornhauser, supra note 7, at 509-11 (asserting that people maintain higher levels of care and
obligation to family members and close friends than to strangers).
42. SeeJane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of
Equvalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 301 (1994) (illustrating polling disparities that show
a large majority of Americans support equal job opportunities for gays and lesbians, but dem-
onstrate that only a minority favors the extension of civil rights laws to cover sexual orienta-
tion).
43. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and
the Income Tax, 70 IND. LJ. 119, 119 (1994) (stating that we "fear and disdain wealth as well as
love it").
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The authors' belief that empirical studies are more valuable than
feminist theory is wrong because it seems to misunderstand the na-
ture of knowledge and truth, and therefore misunderstands the rela-
tionship between theory and empiricism. The authors' faith in scien-
tific objectivity appears to exclude other methods of knowledge.
Science, however, is not the only truth, nor even an absolute truth;
rather, like all areas of human knowledge, it is tentative and evolv-
ing.44
Even physics, the paradigm of objective science, cannot be totally
separated from the larger world. Science is not, and can never be,
totally detached from and uninfluenced by the world which it studies.
Computers may produce and "read" long formulas, but only inter-
pretation gives them meaning. That interpretation is created by cul-
ture. As Sandra Harding has stated:
The formula "1 + 1 = 2" is meaningless unless we are told what is to
count as a case of 1, of =, and so on. The history of chemistry can
be understood in part as the struggle to determine what should
count as the l's, the +'s, and the ='s of chemical "addition." And it
is not just in physics and chemistry that the appropriate meanings
and referents for such apparently obvious terms are debated. As a
famous physicist is alleged to have remarked, if we put one lion and
one rabbit in a cage, we rarely find two animals there one hour
later! Scientific formulas are like legal judgments: the laws be-
come meaningful only through learning (or deciding) how to ap-
ply them, and doing so is a process of social interpretation. s
There are many forms of knowledge and many ways of persuading
others of their value. Science is not always the best method. As the
economist D.N. McCloskey stated:
Not all regression analyses are more persuasive than all moral ar-
guments; not all controlled experiments are more persuasive than
all introspections.
It may be claimed in reply, and often is, that people can agree on
precisely what a regression coefficient means but cannot agree pre-
cisely on the character of their introspection. This is false: people
can converse on the character of their introspections, and do so
habitually about their aesthetic reactions, say, to a painting by
44. See D.N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICs 32-34 (1985) (remarking that
"mathematicians do not 'prove' theorems for ever and ever," but only "temporarily satisfy their
interlocutors in a conversation"). This evolutionary nature of science is self-evident when we
consider some of the scientific truths that we have discarded: the sun revolves around the
earth, the earth is flat, illness results from an imbalance of the four bodily humors (blood,
phlegm, yellow bile, black bile).
45. SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 45 (1986).
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Brueghel or a theory by Lucas. The conversations often reach con-
clusions as precise as human talk can. But even if it were true that
regression is more precise, this would not be a good argument for
economists to abandon introspection in economics. Introspec-
tions, even if imprecise, can be better than regression estimates in-
fected with misspecifications and errors in the variables. That the
regression uses numbers, precise as they look, is irrelevant. To
speak precisely, precision means low variance of estimation; but if
the estimate is greatly biased, it will tell precisely nothing.1
6
Theory and empiricism are not opposites, but rather are engaged
in a joint enterprise. Theory shapes the questions that empiricists
ask; the data they find gains meaning only when it is interpreted, and
that occurs only through theory. Feminists can also be empiricists;
all empiricists use theory. Our knowledge advances through a dia-
logue between theory and empiricism. Thus, the value of theory, in
general, exceeds any particular empirical proof (or lack thereof) be-
cause it is an essential element of a dialectical quest for knowledge.
Feminist theory, like other "outsider '48 theories, is particularly
worthwhile because it is another way of viewing the world, perceiving
truth, and convincing others of it. Outsider theories make us re-
examine purportedly self-evident truths.4 9 The outsider critique may
reveal that what we thought was an inevitable result or institution or
perhaps a neutral principle rests on unexamined premises that do
not necessarily hold true, and in reality are not true for all affected
people. Even if a particular theory ultimately proves incapable of
empirical verification in a particular area, its highest value may be
that we never look at that area the same way again. By forcing us to
examine the previously unexamined, a feminist critique, like any
46. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 44, at 44-45. More bluntly, Professor McCloskey says that, con-
trary to positive economists' claims that the science's techniques of logic and measurement are
"high scholarly standards... [p]ositive economics urges economists to stick with the easy ar-
guments. My regression coefficients are significant at the .01 level: don't bother me with eth-
ics, analogy, testimony, or intellectual tradition." D.N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Eco-
nomics, 86 MICH. L. REv. 752,765 (1988).
47. Although early feminist scholarship concentrated on qualitative studies, many current
feminist scholars now engage in statistical analysis and try to integrate quantitative and qualita-
tive studies. See, e.g., Interview with Tulane University Professor April Brayfield, a sociologist
specializing in gender issues, in New Orleans, La. (Jan. 28, 1997) (on file with author).
48. See Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code,
1996 Wis. L. REv. 751, 751-52. I use the word "outsider," in its common meaning of a person
who is not part of the establishment. Mar Matsuda describes outsiders as "defying the habit of
neutral principles to entrench existing power." Mari J. Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Re-
sponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2325-26 (1989).
49. See Matsuda, supra note 48, at 2325-26; Ann Scales, Feminist Legal Method: Not So Scary, 2
UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 23 (1992) ("Feminist method unlocks objective reality and posits alter-
native claims to truth .... ").
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other outsider critique, forever changes us and our view of the
world.50
So, what do women want? Has my analysis or the Turnier study
succeeded in finding an answer (at least regarding progressivity)
where even Freud has failed? Yes and no. I have suggested that a
feminist ethos of care provides a basis to support a progressive in-
come tax. The Turnier study's initial empirical test of the theory
finds weak support, but fails to disprove the theory due to inherent
weaknesses in polling methods generally and their poll in particular.
Other empirical methods, such as open ended interviews or con-
trolled experiments, might overcome the disadvantages of the poll-
ing method, but possess their own shortcomings.5' No study can fully
capture the complexity of the issues involved. A study can, however,
produce data. This data by itself does not produce knowledge.
However, when it is evaluated and interpreted (acts which must occur
in a theoretical context), it improves our understanding, which then
allows us to refine our theories which in turn may lead to more accu-
rate studies. Thus, we cannot take the theory out of science; science
is inexorably connected to theory.
All theory, however, is not so linked to science. Certain theories
cannot be empirically tested, but they are not intrinsically less valu-
able than those that can be. Knowledge comes in many forms; there
are, for example, moral, religious, spiritual, and aesthetic truths as
well as scientific ones. Knowledge and truth are frequently found in
strange and unsuspected places. We find them, for example, in
524dreams,52 children,5 old wives tales,54 and accidents.55 Even a flawed
50. See Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in Outsider Jurisprudence, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV.
741, 741-42 (1993) (describing how radical feminism has influenced society by achieving re-
forms in the workplace, abortion rights and regulation of pornography).
51. The Turnier study's closed universe (multiple choice) poll has the advantage of easily
quantifiable responses. Its disadvantage, however, is that its format easily distorts answers and
fails to capture complex attitudes. Open-ended interviews may more accurately reflect the re-
spondents' views but are harder to quantify, involve a smaller sample, and still contain bias cre-
ated by the interviewer-interviewee interaction. See Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 643
(illustrating drawbacks of open-ended and multiple choice questions). Controlled experi-
ments create their own distortions by the mere fact that their simplified environment cannot
reflect all the complexities of real life.
52. Many cultures for many ages have found great truths in dreams. Freud, of course,
wrote the classic Interpretation of Dreams. SIGMUND FREUD, INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (1900).
The structure of the benzene molecule was discovered by Friedrich August Kekule von Stra-
donitz who allegedly solved the puzzle of the molecular structure in a dream in which he saw a
circle of snakes each holding the tail of another in its mouth.
53. It was, after all, a child who saw that the emperor wore no clothes.
54. Long before science 'proved' certain facts, mothers knew that a glass of hot milk will
make you sleepy (tryptophan produces serotonin) and that broccoli is good for you (the anti-
oxidants fight cancer).
55. Penicillin was discovered in 1928 by Alexander Fleming who found that a mold grow-
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and non-empirically testable theory can contain truth. Consequently,
searching for knowledge and truth only-or even primarily-
through empirical study unnecessarily cripples the search and con-
stricts its chance of success. Theory and empiricism both advance us
in our quest for truth and knowledge. Therefore, the best way to
search for them is by "letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hun-
dred schools of thought contend," as Mao Tse-Tung, the purveyor of
a notoriously flawed and non-empirically testable theory, once said.56
ing in a culture of germs dissolved the germs. See Penicillin, 15 WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA
215.
56. QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TsE-TUNG 302-03 (1966) (the infamous 'Little Red
Book'). Mao, of course, did not practice his theory.
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